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OBAMA'S NATIONAL SECURITY EXCEPTIONALISM 
SUDHA SETTY* 
INTRODUCTION 
One of the premises of this symposium is that the Obama admin-
istration, in undertaking various executive actions that protect some 
of the vulnerable immigrant populations in the United States, is acting 
in a more rights-protective manner than Congress has explicitly au-
thorized. This Essay juxtaposes this perceived dynamic with policies 
in the counterterrorism and national security realm, areas in which the 
Obama administration has acted directly in contrast to its more rights-
protective stance taken in other areas. 
National security is arguably an exceptional context when com-
pared to other issues that touch on domestic and international law 
and policy, such as immigration. This Essay considers the exception-
alism of Obama administration national security policies, which have 
undercut civil and human rights in ways that disparately impact racial 
and religious minorities. Included in this analysis are the non-prose-
cution of those who endorsed torture of detainees, use of drones for 
targeted killings of citizens and noncitizens, invocations of the state 
secrets privilege, and use of immigration authorities to detain and re-
move those accused of having a connection with terrorist activity. 
The latter part of this Essay situates the Obama administration's 
national security policies in the context of this symposium's examina-
tion of the horizontal and vertical separation of powers. In doing so, 
this Essay concludes that the rule of law distortion at both the domes-
tic and international level is enabled by a pronounced lack of judicial 
engagement and review of most rights-denigrating national security 
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programs, political enabling by Congress, and lack of sustained public 
pressure for reform. 
I. EXAMPLES OF NATIONAL SECURITY EXCEPTIONALISM 
The label of national security exceptionalism fits the Obama ad-
ministration in two ways: first, although the administration has actively 
sought to address and improve the protection of human rights and 
civil rights of racial minorities suffering disparate negative treatment 
in a variety of contexts, those moves toward rights protection gener-
ally do not extend to the realm of counterterrorism abuses. Notably, 
in the post-9/11 counterterrorism context, almost all of those who 
have suffered from violations of human and civil rights are racial 
and/or religious minorities. 1 One of the justifications for this type of 
exceptionalism is based on the widespread view that national security 
is an area in which ordinary legal and constitutional constraints do not 
apply because of the strong deference that ought to be afforded to 
the president in foreign policy matters; 2 related to this type of excep-
tionalism is the outsized perception of the threat of terrorism by politi-
cians and the public, which makes it difficult for the government to 
shift away from its exceptionalist footing. 3 The second mode of ex-
ceptionalism is predicated on the view that the United States plays an 
1. By "rights protection" in the counterterrorism context, I mean those actions taken to 
protect, improve or expand the civil and human rights of those most negatively impacted by the 
U.S. government's post-September 11, 2001, counterterrorism pol icies. Although judges, schol-
ars, and lawyers can argue as to the efficacy and legality of such measures, within the United 
States, the disparate impact of post-September 11 counterterrorism laws and policies has been 
borne heavily by Muslims, Arabs, and people hailing from-or appearing to hail from-South 
Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa. See, e.g., David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 
953, 957 (2002) (couching the disparate treatment of counterterrorism policies as falling on Arab 
noncitizens); Gil Gott, The Devil We Know: Racial Subordination and National Security Law, 50 
VILL. L. REV. 1073, 1073 (2005) (analyzing how "liberal democratic systems might evolve ... to 
counter the socially and politically pernicious effects of ... religiously-inflected, aU-or-nothing-
warfare"); Natsu Taylor Saito, Beyond the Citizen/Alien Dichotomy: Uberty, Security, and the 
Exercise of Plenary Power, 14 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 389, 391-92 (2005) (defining 
otherness as based on race, national origin, ethnicity, and other factors apart from citizenship); 
Girardeau A. Spann, Terror and Race, 45 WASHBURN L.J. 89, 1-02 (2005) (observing that "the 
sacrifice of racial minority interests for majoritarian gain appears to be an intrinsic feature of 
United States culture"); Tom R. Tyler et al., Legitimacy and Deterrence Effects in Counter-Ter-
rorism Policing: A Study of Muslim Americans, 44 LAw & Soc'v REV. 365, 366 (2010). 
2. E.g., John Yoo, The Terrorist Surveillance Program and the Constitution, 1714 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 565 (2007) (arguing that national security surveillance is largely beyond the pur-
view of Congress and the judiciary); Cf. Aziz Huq, Against National Security Exceptionalism, 
2009 SUP. CT. REV. 225 (2010) (arguing that, in some cases, the assumption that national se-
curity-related cases are treated in an exceptional manner does not bear out). 
3. See Paul Campos, Undressing the Terror Threat, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 9, 2010), 
http://www. wsj.com/articles/SB 1 00014240527 4870413090457 4644651587677752 (arguing 
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exceptional role on the world stage in terms of its responsibility to po-
lice global actions by exercising its hard and soft power; as such, it 
has the right to act in ways that would arguably not be tolerated by 
the United States if undertaken by a different nation. 4 
A. Improving Rights Protection in Some Non-security Con-
texts 
Looking at almost seven years of his presidency, it is clear that 
President Obama has prioritized improving the government's footing 
on several human and civil rights issues, a number of which have fo-
cused on areas in which a racially disparate impact is obvious. For 
many of these areas, the Obama administration has undertaken its 
efforts unilaterally, despite a reluctant or sometimes contrary Con-
gress. Immigration is one of these contexts, but other examples re-
flect presidential efforts toward better protections for racial minorities 
as well. 5 1n the context of voting rights, President Obama immediately 
pushed back against the Supreme Court's gutting of Section 5 of the 
Voting Rights Act of 1965 in its Shelby County v. Holder-6 decision of 
2013, ordering the Justice Department to continue litigating voting 
rights cases aggressively and creatively while pushing Congress to 
that the risk of death from terrorism versus other causes is comparatively infinitesimal, yet gov-
ernment resources are not proportionately allocated); Nate Silver, Crunching the Risk Numbers, 
WALL ST. J. (Jan. 8, 2010), http://www.wsj.com/arti-
cles/SB10001424052748703481004574646963713065116 (same as Campos). 
4. President Obama's 2014 commencement address at West Point embodied a variety 
of arguably complementary, arguably conflicting thoughts on the notion of American exception-
al ism. At one point, he noted, "I believe in American exceptionalism with every fiber of my being. 
But what makes us exceptional is not our ability to flout international norms and the rule of law, 
it is our willingness to affirm them through our actions." President Barack Obama, Commence-
ment Address at the United States Military Academy in West Point, N.Y. (May 28, 2014), in U.S. 
GOV'T PUBL'G OFFICE, DAILY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DoCUMENTS, 2014, at 3, 7. At an-
other point, he offered that "America must always lead on the world stage. If we don't, no one 
else will ," /d. at 3, and continued this theme with the following: 
The United States will use military force, unilaterally if necessary, when our core interests de-
mand it: when our people are threatened, when our livelihoods are at stake, when the security 
of our allies is in danger. In these circumstances, we still need to ask tough questions about 
whether our actions are proportional and effective and just. International opinion matters, but 
America should never ask permission to protect our people, our homeland, or our way of life. 
/d. 
5. The following list of activities is meant to be selective, not exhaustive; further, if the 
scope of analysis were broadened to include issues for which racially disparate impact is not 
facially obvious, other unilateral rights-protective measures undertaken by the Obama admin-
istration could be considered, such as the broadening of workplace, health care, and marital tax 
filing protections for LGBTQ federal employees. 
6. Shelby County, Ala. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). 
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restore the protections removed by the Shelby decision. 7 On the is-
sue of racially disparate sentencing for non-violent drug-related 
crimes, President Obama not only signed the Fair Sentencing Act of 
20108 and encouraged the reduction in mandatory minimum sen-
tences, 9 but has also exercised unilateral executive action to encour-
age those sentenced under the prior racially disparate sentencing 
framework to seek clemency, 10 and continued to use his clemency 
power to order the release of some of those convicts. 11 With regard 
to unarmed racial minorities being harassed, abused, or killed by po-
lice, President Obama has spoken out forcefully, moved toward the 
demilitarization of local police forces, 12 ordered better training and 
controls when federal military equipment is transferred to state and 
local police departments, 13 emphasized the need to improve commu-
nity policing, 14 and created a task force to "strengthen public trust and 
foster strong relationships between local law enforcement and the 
communities that they protect, while also promoting effective crime 
7. See Press Release, White House, President Barack Obama, Statement by the Presi-
dent on the Supreme Court Ruling on Shelby County v. Holder (June 25, 2013) (on file at 
https:I/WNW.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/25/statement-president-supreme-court-
ruling-shelby-county-v-holder); see also Jackie Calmes, Obama Reassures Leaders on Enforc-
ing Voting Rights, N.Y. TIMES (July 29, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/30/us/poli-
tics/obama-reassures-leaders-on-enforcing-voting-rights.html (describing conversations 
among President Obama, Attorney General Holder and civil rights leaders on ways in which the 
Obama administration would seek to maintain protection of voting rights despite the Shelby 
ruling). 
8. Fair Sentencing Act, Pub. L. No. 111-220. 
9. See Matt Apuzzo, Holder Endorses Proposal to Reduce Drug Sentences in Latest Sign 
of Shift, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 13, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/14/us/politics/holder-en-
dorses-proposal-to-reduce-drug-sentences.html. 
10. See Matt Apuzzo, Justice Dept. Starls Quest to Find Inmates to be Freed, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan. 30, 2014), http:I/WNW.nytimes.com/2014/01/31/us/politics/white-house-seeks-drug-clem-
ency-candidates.html. 
11. MichaelS. Schmidt, U.S. to Release 6,000 Inmates from Prisons, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 6, 
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/20 15/1 0/07/us/us-to-release-6000-inmates-under-new-sen-
tencing-guidelines.html (describing plans to commute the sentences of some offenders con-
victed of non-violent drug-related crimes). 
12. See Tanya Somanader, Why President Obama is Taking Steps to Demilitarize Local 
Police Forces, WHITE HOUSE: BLOG (May 18, 2015, 7:44 PM), 
https:/lwww. whitehouse.gov/blog/20 15/05/18/why-president-obama-taking-steps-demilitarize-
local-police-forces. 
13. See generally EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, REVIEW: FEDERAL SUPPORT FOR LOCAL 
lAW ENFORCEMENT EQUIPMENT ACQUISITION (2014). 
14. Fact Sheet: Strengthening Community Policing, WHITE HousE (Dec. 1, 2014), 
https://www. whitehouse. gov/the-press-office/20 14/12/0 1/fact-sheet-strengthening-comm unity-
policing. 
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reduction."15 In these contexts and others, President Obama has 
made clear that he intends to use political capital and resources to 
address some of the civil and human rights challenges in which racial 
minorities have been negatively impacted by government policies and 
actions. 
B. Security Contexts with a Mixed Record of Rights 
Protection 
In response to human and civil rights abuses occurring during the 
George W. Bush administration as a result of national security and 
counterterrorism programs, President Obama initially promised 16 sub-
stantial shifts in policy to better protect rights. 17 Although the lofty 
goals he set forth on the campaign trail in 2008 and early in his ad-
ministration in 2009 have largely not been met, he has taken some 
steps to better protect human and civil rights in some areas. Well-
known examples include his issuance of executive orders in early 
2009 to end the use of torture on detainees18 and to close the deten-
tion facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. 19 These moves toward im-
proved rights protection were laudable, but were tempered by other 
15. Fact Sheet: Task Force on 2151 Century Policing, WHITE HousE (Dec. 18, 2014), 
https:/lwww. whitehouse. gov/the-press-office/2014/12/18/fact -sheet -task -force-21 st-century-
policing. 
16. President Barack Obama, Inaugural Address, in 1 PUB. PAPERS, Jan. 20, 2009, at 2. 
https:/lwww.whitehouse.gov/blog/inaugural-address (rejecting the idea that there must be a 
trade-off between protection of civil liberties and national security). 
17. The need to increase rights protections in the national security context operates from 
the premise that such changes are necessary to comport with the rule of law and human rights 
law and norms. Many thoughtful scholars have argued that the current structures in place with 
regard to security policies, such as the use of drones for targeted kill ing, have achieved a posi-
tive, if not ideal, balance of individual rights and security imperatives. See, e.g., Robert M. 
Chesney, Who May Be Killed? Anwar ai-Awlaki as a Case Study in the International Legal Reg-
ulation of Lethal Force, 13 YEARBOOK INT'L HUMANITARIAN L. 3 (2010), http://pa-
pers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1754223 (arguing that the Obama administration 
has satisfied its international law obligations with regard to the targeted killing of U.S. citizen 
Anwar ai-Awlaki); Matthew Waxman, Going Clear, FOREIGNPoucv (Mar. 20, 2013), 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/03/20/going_clear (arguing that greater transpar-
ency with regard to the drone program may not be an improvement over the current situation); 
see also JACK GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT: THE ACCOUNTABLE PRESIDENT AFTER 9/11 
(2012) (arguing that executive power has been appropriately constrained by various factors in 
the post-9/11 era). 
18. Exec. Order No, 13491-Ensuring Lawful Interrogations, 74 Fed. Reg. 4893, 4894 
(Jan. 22, 2009). 
19. Exec. Order No. 13492-Review and Disposition of Individuals Detained at the Guan-
tfmamo Bay Naval Base and Closure of Detention Facilit ies, 74 Fed. Reg. 4897, 4898 (Jan. 22, 
2009). The Guantanamo Bay detention facility is still open, but the number of detainees has 
dropped from 242 at the beginning of the Obama presidency to 116 as of summer 2015. See 
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policies or aspects of the administration's decision making. In rare in-
stances, the Obama administration has paid compensation to individ-
uals who were abused in some way due to national security 
overzealousness during the Bush administration, 20 but this has been 
more of an exception than the general practice of the administration, 
wh ich has been to use a variety of tactics to seek dismissal of lawsuits 
seeking recompense for national security abuses and to cover up 
abuses when p0ssible.21 
For example, despite President Obama's statement affirming the 
illegality of torture, a continuing United Nations investigation into U.S. 
torture, 22 and ample evidence made public by the Senate that torture 
was committed by U.S. government agents under the George W. 
Bush administration, 23 the Obama administration has made no moves 
toward seeking accountability for those who authorized, supervised, 
ordered, or carried out the torture. This is particularly noteworthy in 
the context of this symposium, which considers whether and the ex-
tent to which the Obama administration has gone above and beyond 
congressional authorization in granting protections and rights to cer-
tain immigrants; in the case of torture, we see not only a lack of ac-
countability over the responsible individuals, but also a years-long 
fight by the Obama administration to keep the detailed findings of the 
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence secret and out of public 
Guantanamo by the Numbers, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/de-
fauiUfiles/gtmo-by-the-numbers.pdf (last updated Oct. 7, 2015). 
20. In early 2015, the Obama administration settled a lawsuit with Abdullah ai-Kidd, who 
had been detained for sixteen days in 2003 under the federal material witness statute based on 
gross misrepresentations made by a federal agent on his warrant for detention. As a result of 
the settlement, ai-Kidd was paid $385,000 and was issued an apology by the government. See 
Rebecca Boone, US Citizen Settles Lawsuit Over Post-9111 Arrest with FBI, SEATTLE TIMES 
(Jan. 16, 2015, 3:53 PM), http://www.seattletimes.com/nation-world/us-citizen-settles-lawsuit-
over -post-9-11-arrest-with-fbi/. 
21. See infra Pari 2, Why Not National Security Exceptionalism?. 
22. The United States has followed up its periodic reports to the UN Committee Against 
Torture with testimony as to how U.S. policies have changed such that torture is no longer 
committed in the name of national security, but has not gone furlher in promising accountability 
over prior acts of torture. See Tom Malinowski, Assistant Sec'y, State for Democracy, Human 
Rights and Labor, U.S. Dep't of State, Opening Statement before the United Nations Committee 
Against Torture (Nov. 12, 2014), on U.S. MISSION GENEVA, https://geneva.usmis-
sion. gov/20 14/11/12/malinowski-torture-and-degrading-treatment-and-punishment -are-forbid-
den-in-all-places-at-all-times-with-no-exceptions/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2015). 
23. See SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, COMMITIEE STUDY OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE 
AGENCY'S DETENTION AND INTERROGATION PROGRAM, S. REP. NO. 113-288 (2014) [hereinafter 
Senate torture report] (detailing the many known instances of torture against detainees, as well 
as the cover up attempted by individuals within the Central Intelligence Agency). 
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view. 24 Where the Senate acted forcefully to detail human rights 
abuses, the administration continues to remain conspicuously silent 
as to its obligation to hold perpetrators accountable. Statements de-
nouncing torture and promises that this administration will not use 
such tactics on detainees are better than the Bush administration's 
actions, but they remain insufficient and the failure to prosecute seri-
ous allegations of torture remains in violation of the United States' 
international obligations. 
Another example of the Obama administration's marginal shifts 
towards rights protection is its movement of some cases from military 
commissions to Article Ill courts under the theory that federal courts 
are an effective venue for prosecutors to secure convictions, and they 
obviate the rule of law concerns concomitant with the use of special-
ized military commissions for terrorist acts.25 Using Article Ill courts 
as opposed to military commissions is a shift that moves toward 
greater rights protection for those on trial, but the reality also includes 
the fact that federal prosecutors of terrorism acts have the deck 
stacked in their favor in terms of being able to suspend Miranda rights 
24. See Connie Bruck, Dianne Feinstein v. the CIA, NEW YORKER (June 22, 2015), 
http:/lvvww.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/06/22/the-inside-war (detailing the lengthy argu-
ments between Senator Dianne Feinstein, chair of the Senate committee that researched and 
wrote the Senate torture report, and the administration as to the release of the unclassified 
portion of the report to the public); Charlie Savage, U.S. Tells Court That Documents From 
Torture Investigation Should Remain Secret, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2014), http://www.ny-
times.com/2014/12/11/us/politics/us-tells-court-that-documents-from-torture-investigation-
should-remain-secret.html?_r-=0 (describing protracted litigation over FOIA requests for infor-
mation about the DOJ torture investigation, and administration efforts to keep information se-
cret). See also Dan Froomkin, Holder, Too Late, Calls for Transparency on DOJ Torture 
Investigation, INTERCEPT (Oct. 15, 2015), https://theintercept.corn/2015/1 0/15/holder-too-late-
calls-for-transparency-on-doj-torture-investigation/ (noting that former Attorney General Holder 
lamented the lack of transparency over the DOJ torture investigation only after he left office). 
25. See Eric H. Holder, Jr., Att'y Gen., Speech at the University of California Berkeley 
School of Law Commencement (May 22, 2013) (transcript at http://www.jus-
tice.gov/opa/speechlattorney-general-eric-holder-speaks-university-california-berkeley-school-
law). Holder noted that: 
[T]hose who claim that our federal courts are incapable of handling terrorism cases are not 
registering a dissenting opinion. They are simply wrong. Their assertions ignore reality. And 
attempting to limit the use of these courts would weaken our ability to incapacitate and to punish 
those who target our people and attempt to terrorize our communities. Throughout history, our 
federal courts have proven to be an unparalleled instrument for bringing terrorists to justice. 
They have enabled us to convict scores of people of terrorism-related offenses since September 
11. 
/d. ; see also Sudha Setty, Comparative Perspectives on Specialized Trials for Terrorism, 63 
MAINE L. REv. 131 (2010) (arguing that the use of military commissions or other specialized 
terrorism courts is problematic from a rule of law perspective). 
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for a lengthy time, 26 use an extremely broad material support statute 
to convict or as leverage in plea bargain negotiations, 27 and defend 
against claims of entrapment with virtually guaranteed success. 28 De-
spite these significant limitations, some argument can be made that 
the Obama administration has shifted at least marginally in a rights-
protective direction on these matters; the same cannot be said for a 
number of other national security contexts. 
C. Security Contexts in Which Exceptionalism Is at its 
Highest 
Numerous contexts exist in which the Obama administration has 
either actively undermined attempts at accountability over human and 
civil rights abuses committed under the auspices of a national securi ty 
or counterterrorism program, or has kept secret the arguably abusive 
programs in order to shield them from accountability. In this section, 
three such contexts are discussed:29 (1) the use of unmanned aerial 
26. See F.B.I. Memorandum, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 25, 2011), http:I/'MVW.ny-
times.com/2011/03/25/us/25miranda-text.html (detailing the circumstances under which Mi-
randa warnings can be delayed when interrogating terrorism suspects). This Justice 
Department policy came under public scrutiny in conjunction with the interrogation of the 2013 
Boston marathon bomber, Dzhokhar Tsamaev, who was detained and questioned for a pro-
longed period of time before being read his Miranda rights. See Charlie Savage, Debate Over 
Delaying of Miranda Warning, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 20, 2013), http:I/'MVW.ny-
times.com/2013/04121/us/a-debate-over-delaying-suspects-miranda-rights.html. 
27. See Counterterrorism Efforts, OFFICES OF THE U.S. ATI'YS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 
http://'MVW.justice.gov/usao/priority-areas/national-security/counterterrorism-efforts (last up-
dated Dec. 8, 2014) (discussing the importance of the material support statute to federal pros-
ecutors); Wadie E. Said, The Material Support Prosecution and Foreign Policy, 86 IND. L.J. 543 
(2011) (critiquing the breadth and vagueness of the material support statute as allowing for too 
much discretion in prosecuting Muslims with views that are contrary to U.S. foreign policy inter-
ests). The material support statute is so useful to prosecutors in the United States that the De-
partment of Justice has provided advice to other nations on how they can import a similar 
prosecutorial model for domestic use. See Attorney General Holder Urges International Effort 
to Confront Threat of Syrian Foreign Fighters, Justice News, U.S. DEP'T OF JusncE (July 8, 
2014), http://'MVW.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-holder-urges-international-effort~n­
front-threat-syrian-foreign-fighters. 
28. See CTR. ON LAW & SEC., N.Y. UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, TERRORIST TRIAL REPORT CARD: 
SEPTEMBER 11, 2001-SEPTEMBER 11, 2011 26 (2011), http:I/'MVW.Iawandsecurity.org/por-
tals/0/documents/ttrc%20ten%20year%20issue.pdf (noting that post-9/11 entrapment defenses 
in terrorism prosecutions have never been successful); Paul Harris, Fake Terror Plots, Paid 
Informants: The Tactics of FBI 'Entrapment' Questioned, GUARDIAN (Nov. 16, 201 1), 
http:/I'MVW.theguardian.com/wortd/2011/nov/16/fbi-entrapment-fake-terror-plots. 
29. These three contexts are by no means inclusive of all of the ways in which the Obama 
administration's counterterrorism activities have had a disparate negative impact on people who 
are Muslim, or Arab or South Asian descent, or those perceived to fall into one ofthose catego-
ries. See Sudha Setty, Country Report on Counterterrorism: United States of America, 62 AM. 
J. COMP. L. 643 (2014) (offering a more comprehensive accounting of the Obama administra-
tion's counterterrorism activit ies). 
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vehicles (UAVs or drones) for targeted killings, (2) the invocation of 
the state secrets privilege to seek dismissal of civil lawsuits involving 
sensitive government information, and (3) the use of immigration law 
to detain and remove noncitizens accused of a connection to terrorist 
activity. Each of these embodies at least one aspect of the national 
security exceptionalism identified above: that the type of authority 
claimed by the president is appropriate because it is within his unilat-
eral purview, that terrorism poses an exceptional and unacceptable 
threat to the United States that must be countered forcefully, and that 
the United States must play an exceptional role within the counterter-
rorism sphere and this role may justify excessive behavior in some 
instances. 
1. Drones 
President Obama expanded the use of drones for targeted kill-
ings30 of suspected terrorists during his administration. 31 Administra-
tion officials have repeatedly emphasized the necessity, efficacy, and 
legality of targeted killings as a counterterrorism tool, 32 and have re-
sisted the idea that other branches of government should play a sig-
nificant role over the question of who is killed by drones (citizen vs. 
noncitizen) and under what circumstances. Nonetheless, the program 
has prompted much debate over the basic question of whether such 
a program ought to exist, 33 the moral calculus of extrajudicial killings 
by remote control, 34 the legal parameters and authorities for such a 
30. Although targeted killing is not defined under international law, it is often considered to 
encompass "premeditated acts of lethal force employed by states in times of peace or during 
armed conflict to eliminate specific individuals outside their custody." See Jonathan Masters, 
Targeted Killings, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (May 23, 2013), http://www.cfr.org/counter-
terrorism/targeted-killings/p9627. Although the governments that utilize targeted killings differ-
entiate them from assassinations, see Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep't of State, 
Remarks at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law (Mar. 25, 2010) 
(transcript at http://www.state.gov/s/Vreleases/remarks/139119.htm), crit ics view them as simi-
lar actions in terms of illegality. See, e.g., Complaint at 1, AI-Aulaqi v. Panetta, No. 1:12-cv-
01192-RMC (O.D.C. July 18, 2012). 
31. See Drone Database, NEW AM. FOUND., http://securitydata.newamerica.neUabouthtml 
(last visited Feb. 4, 2014) (detailing the number of drone strikes by the United States in Yemen 
and Pakistan since 2004). 
32. See Koh, supra note 30, at 7-8. 
33. See, e.g. , U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudi-
cial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions: Study on Targeted Killings, U.N. Doc. 
NHRC/14/24/Add.G (May 28, 2010) [hereinafter U.N. Human Rights Council] (questioning the 
legality of the CIA drone program). 
34. See generally Samuel lssacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Drones and the Dilemma of 
Modem Warfare (N.Y.U. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 13-34, 2013) (theorizing the moral 
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program, 35 and specific questions regarding the legality of its scope 
in terms of geographic location and citizenship of the target. 36 The 
Obama administration took two positions as to the nature of the war 
being waged with drones that raised additional concerns: first, the as-
sertion that the theater of war for U.S. counterterrorism efforts encom-
passes the entire globe;J? and second, statements made by 
administration officials in early 2013 that although the country should 
not remain on a war footing permanently, we should expect the cur-
rent counterterrorism efforts to last at least ten to twenty years 
longer. 38 Despite the boundless geographic and extremely broad du-
rational scope around the targeted killing program, its parameters re-
main largely shielded from public view except at points at which it 
serves the Obama administration to make such information public. 39 
Limited information has been disclosed in occasional speeches by 
dilemma of drone use in the context of warfare in which geographic and other traditional bound-
aries of violence are distorted). 
35. See U.N. Human Rights Council, supra note 33, at~ 28-92 (discussing international 
law of war principles with regard to targeted killings); Eric H. Holder, Jr., Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't 
of Justice, Speech at Northwestern University School of Law (Mar. 5, 2012) (transcript at 
http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2012/ag-speech-1203051.html) (outlining the pa-
rameters used by the Obama administration to determine whether a targeted kill ing comports 
with international and domestic legal obligations); Jeh C. Johnson, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Dep't of 
Defense, Speech on National Security Law, Lawyers and Lawyering in the Obama Administra-
tion (Feb. 22, 2012) (transcript at http://www.cfr.org/defense-and-security/jeh-johnsons-speech-
national-security-law-lawyers-lawyering-obama-administration/p27448) (echoing previous ad-
ministration legal justifications for targeted killing); Koh, supra note 30, at 7-8 (arguing that the 
Obama administration's use of targeted killing as a counterterrorism tool complied with interna-
tional and domestic legal obligations). 
36. See AI-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 9, 54 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (dismissing, based 
on standing grounds, the suit of Nasser ai-Aulaqi to enjoin the U.S. government from keeping 
his son, U.S. citizen Anwar ai-Aulaqi, on its targeted killing list). 
37. Spencer Ackerman, Pentagon Spec Ops Chief Sees '10 to 20' More Years of War 
Against AI-Qaida, WIRED.COM (May 16, 2013, 11:49 AM), http:l/www.wired.com/danger-
roorn/2013/05/decades-of-war/ (discussing the Senate testimony of Michael Sheehan, the as-
sistant secretary of defense for special operations and low-intensity conflict, with regard to the 
global theater of war). 
38. /d. (relating the Senate testimony of Michael Sheehan, the Assistant Secretary of De-
fense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, with regard to the probable duration of 
the U.S. counterterrorism effort against ai-Qaida). 
39. See David Pozen, The Leaky Leviathan: Why the Government Condemns and Con-
dones Unlawful Disclosures of Information, 127 HARv. L. REV. 512, 625-26 (2013); see, e.g., 
Stephanie Condon, Obama: Anwar ai-Awlaki's Death a "Major Blow" to a/ Qaeda and Affiliates, 
CBS NEWS (Sept. 30, 2011, 4:40PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/obama-anwar-al-awlakis-
death-a-major-blow-to-al-qaeda-and-affiliates/ (relating comments by President Obama about 
the strategic importance of the targeted killing Anwar ai-Awlaki, an American citizen in Yemen). 
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administration officials40 and a classified Department of Justice mem-
orandum that was leaked in early 2013.41 That leak prompted a May 
2013 speech in which President Obama looked to defend the legality 
of the targeted kill ings program. 42 At the same time that the admin-
istration discussed and leaked aspects of the program, it also used 
the classified43 nature of the program to shield itself from media in-
quiry44 and from judicial accountability, using the standing doctrine 
and state secrets privilege to secure the dismissal of a suit challeng-
ing the constitutionality of the program. That suit was brought on be-
half of U.S. citizen Anwar ai-Awlaki, who had been placed on the 
government's targeted killings list, 45 and who was later killed by a 
drone.46 This hypocrisy undermined the credibility of the administra-
tion as the restorer of the rule of law and protector of human and civil 
40. E.g. , Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Patrick J. 
Leahy, Chairman, U.S. Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, in Holder Letter on Counterterror 
Strikes Against U.S. Citizens, N.Y. TIMES (May 22, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/interac-
tive/2013/05/23/us/politics/23holder-drone-lettter .html? _r-=1 & (detailing the administration's le-
gal basis for the use of targeted killings against Anwar ai-Awlaqi and other U.S. citizens 
overseas); John 0. Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Sec. & Counterterrorism, 
Remarks of John 0. Brennan: Strengthening our Security by Adhering to our Values and Laws 
(Sept. 16, 2011 ), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/09/16/remarks-john-o-bren-
nan-strengthening-our-security-adhering-our-values-an; Johnson, supra note 35; Koh, supra 
note 30, at 7~. 
41 . See U.S DEP'T OF JUSTICE, lAWFULNESS OF A LETHAL OPERATION DIRECTED AGAINST A 
U.S. CITIZEN WHO IS A SENIOR OPERATIONAL LEADER OF Al-QA'IDA OR AN ASSOCIATED FORCE 
(2011), 
http:llmsnbcmedia.msn.comli/msnbclsectionslnews/020413_DOJ _ White_Paper.pdf [hereinaf-
ter DOJ White Paper]. 
42. See President Barack Obama, Remarks at National Defense University (May 23, 
2013), in U.S. GOV'T PUBL'G OFFICE, 2013, DAILY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS, at 
5-6 [hereinafter May 2013 NDU Speech]. 
43. See Jo Becker & Scott Shane, Secret 'Kill Ust' Proves a Test of Obama's Principles 
and Will, N.Y. TIMES (May 29, 2012), http:llwww.nytimes.com/2012/05/29/worldlobamas-lead-
ership-in-war-on-al-qaeda.html?_r=O (discussing internal administration debates as to whether 
to declassify the legal justifications for the drone program, and noting that the administration 
decided not to do so); Charlie Savage, Secret U.S. Memo Made Legal Case to Kill a Citizen, 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 8, 2011 ), http:llwww.nytimes.com/2011/1 0/09/worldlmiddleeasUsecret-us-
memo-made-legal-case-to-kill-a-citizen.html (offering details of a still-classified Office of Legal 
Counsel memorandum justifying the targeted killings of U.S. citizens). 
44. See, e.g. , N.Y. Times Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 915 F. Supp. 2d 508 (S.D. N.Y. Jan. 
3, 2013) (dismissing requests made under the Freedom of Information Act for documents re-
garding the targeted killing program, based on the administration's claim of necessary secrecy 
surrounding counterterrorism programs). 
45. See AI-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D. D.C. 2010) (dismissing the suit brought 
by the father of U.S. citizen Anwar ai-Awlaki, which sought an injunction against the targeted 
killing of his son, based on a lack of standing and administration claims of necessary secrecy 
surrounding counterterrorism programs). 
46. Anwar ai-Awlaki was killed by a drone strike in September 2011. See Charlie Savage, 
Court Releases Large Parts of Memo Approving Killing of American in Yemen, N.Y. TIMES (June 
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rights, and instead invited comparisons to the Bush administration 
that the Obama administration likely wished to avoid for the purposes 
of garnering domestic and international support. 47 
In his May 2013 speech, President Obama focused largely on 
the parameters for targeted killings, reiterating known positions of the 
administration that drone strikes were legal under international law 
standards48 because they defended against "imminent" threats, 49 
stating that U.S. citizenship is no protection against being targeted for 
a drone strike, 50 and making clear that he could keep as much of the 
drone program secret as he deemed. 51 Throughout the Obama pres-
idency, the administration has offered only two rights-protective con-
cessions with regard to the drone program, and neither provides 
significant comfort: first, in 2013, President Obama announced a plan 
to curtail sharply the use of signature strikes52 in Yemen and instead 
use drone strikes only for those individuals targeted by the admin-
istration, 53 likely in response to media coverage of tragic civilian 
deaths54 and criticism over administration prevarications as to how 
23, 2014 ). http://www. nytimes.com/20 14/06/24/us/justice-department-fou nd-it-lawful-to-target-
anwar-al-awlaki.html. 
47. See, e.g., Jack Goldsmith, HowObama Undermined the War on Terror, NEW REPUBLIC 
(May 1, 2013), www.newrepublic.com/article/112964/obamas-secrecy-destroying-american-
support-counterterrorism (arguing that Obama's lack of transparency on drones and other is-
sues has undermined U.S. efforts to build alliances that would bolster U.S. foreign policy and 
counterterrorism goals). 
48. Compare May 2013 NDU Speech, supra note 42, at 5, with Holder, supra note 35, and 
Koh, supra note 30, at 7-S (President Obama articulated proportionality and distinction princi-
ples that largely reflected the standards offered by Attorney General Holder and State Depart-
ment Legal Adviser Koh in previous speeches). 
49. May 2013 NDU Speech, supra note 42, at 6 (articulating similar definitions as to the 
"imminence" of a perceived threat for the purposes of ordering a targeted killing). 
50. Compare id. , supra note 42, at 8 (noting that "the high threshold that we've set for 
taking lethal action applies to all potential terrorist targets, regardless of whether or not they are 
American citizens"), with Holder, supra note 35, at 6. 
51. See May 2013 NDU Speech, supra note 42, at 7, 10. 
52. See Becker & Shane, supra note 43 (explaining that the Obama administration used 
"signature strikes" in Pakistan, in which groups of people engaging in apparently suspicious 
behavior were allowed to be targeted for a drone strike, even if no terrorists or terrorist support-
ers were known to be in the group). 
53. See May 2013 NDU Speech, supra note 42, at 4-5. 
54. See, e.g., Becker & Shane, supra note 43 (discussing a 2009 drone strike that "killed 
not only its intended target, but also two neighboring families, and left behind a trail of cluster 
bombs that subsequently killed more innocents . . . . Videos of children's bodies and angry 
tribesmen holding up American missile parts flooded YouTube, fueling a ferocious backlash that 
Yemeni officials said bolstered AI Qaeda"); Eye of the Drone, HARPER's MAG. (June 2012), 
http:l/harpers.org/archive/2012/06/eye-of-the-drone/ (describing those killed by a drone strike 
in a Pakistani village and the reluctance of families to congregate for fear of being killed by 
drones). 
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many civi lians had been killed by drone strikes. 55 However, in the first 
half of 2015, the administration had used signature strikes in Yemen 
at least twelve times. 56 Second, in 2013, then-Attorney General Eric 
Holder conceded to Senator Rand Paul that the president does not 
have the authority to use a weaponized drone to kill an American not 
engaged in combat on American soil, 57 apparently leaving open the 
possibility of noncitizens being killed anywhere, U.S. citizens being 
killed outside of the United States, and U.S. citizens being killed within 
the United States if the administration believes that they are engaged 
in "combat." 
Given the boundless geographic scope and lengthy predicted du-
ration of this confl ict, alongside the administration's robust defense of 
both the effectiveness and legality of the program, it would seem that 
instituting proper accountability measures-by Congress and/or the 
judiciary-would be essential to protect against and provide redress 
for arbitrary or abusive decision-making in the process of extra-judi-
cial killings. Yet this area persists as one in which national security 
exceptionalism has prevailed. Congress has expressed little will in 
setting meaningful parameters on the program, 58 and the judiciary 
has shied away from adjudicating the legality of placing targets for 
extrajudicial killings on a government list, even if those targets are 
U.S. citizens who are not "imminently" attacking the United States in 
any conventional sense of the word. 59 Actual protection of rights 
55. See Scott Shane, C.I.A. is Disputed on Civilian Toll in Drone Strikes, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug.1 1, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/201 1/08/12/world/asia/12drones.html (relating evi-
dence from various sources that the civilian toll of drone strikes was significantly higher than the 
C.I.A. had claimed); Micah Zenko, Why Won't the White House Say How Many Civilians Its 
Drones Kill?, ATLANTIC (June 5, 2012, 8:45 AM), http:/lwww.theatlantic.com/intemational/ar-
chive/2012/06/why-wont-the-white-house-say-how-many-civilians-its-drones-kill/2581 01/ (not-
ing that John Brennan affirmed in 2011 that "[!]here hasn't been a single collateral death 
because of the exceptional proficiency, precision of the capabilities we've been able to de-
velop"); see also Becker & Shane, supra note 43 (noting that the C.I.A. had previously counted 
all military-age males killed by drone strikes as combatants, thereby drastically reducing the 
number of individuals possibly counted as part of the civilian death toll). 
56. See Greg Miller, CIA Didn't Know Strike Would Hit ai-Qaeda Leader, WASH. PosT 
(June 17. 20 15), https:/lwww. washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/al-qaedas-leader-in-
yemen-killed-in-signature-strike-us-officials-say/2015/06/17/9fe6673c-151 b-11 e5-89f3-
6141 Oda94eb1_story.html. 
57. Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Senator Rand Paul, 
PAUL.SENATE.Gov (Mar. 7, 2013) (on file at http://www.paul.senate.gov/files/docu-
ments/WhiteHouseLetter.pdf). 
58. To date, Congress has not taken any action on curbing the Obama administration's 
use of drones for targeted killings. Administration lawyers have taken the position that disclosure 
to, consultation with, or approval from Congress is unnecessary and unwarranted with regard 
to drone strikes. See DOJ White Paper, supra note 41. 
59. See AI-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 54 (D.D.C. 201 0). 
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would necessitate more than rhetoric about the efficacy and legality 
of the drone program that cannot actually be examined and verified 
because of executive branch secrecy. 60 
2. State Secrets Privilege 
Focus on invocations of the state secrets privilege ramped up 
during President Bush's second term with the emergence of a pattern 
of the administration seeking dismissals of lawsuits during the plead-
ings stage, even when the suits dealt with allegations of extraordinary 
rendition, unlawful detention and torture, and the suits were the last 
attempts of gravely injured individuals to vindicate their rights.61 De-
spite substantial evidence that ci tizens of Germany62 and the United 
Kingdom, 63 among others, were rendered by the United States gov-
ernment to other nations and were subsequently abused by the secu-
rity forces in the nations to which they were rendered, their civil suits 
have been dismissed on state secrets grounds. 64 Congress dis-
cussed reining in the executive's increasing reliance on the state se-
crets privilege as a means of escaping the possibility of accountability 
several times: it debated the State Secrets Protection Act of 200865 
and reintroduced nearly identical reform legislation in February 
60. Leaking of government information continues to be the primary method by which the 
media, the public and Congress has been able to prompt further government disclosures about 
the drone program. In October, 2015, the Intercept media organization used leaked information 
to report on numerous aspects of the U.S. targeted killing program. See The Drone Papers, 
INTERCEPT, https:/ltheintercept.com/drone-papers (last visited Oct. 24, 2015). As of this writing, 
the U.S. government has not issued a response. 
61. Press Release, Office of Sen. Edward M. Kennedy, Sen. Kennedy Introduces State 
Secrets Protection Act (Jan. 22, 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted), in NEWSROOM, 2008 
WLNR 1256008; William G. Weaver & Robert M. Pallitto, state Secrets and Executive Power, 
120 POL. SCI. Q. 85, 109 (2005) (claiming that the Bush administration is using the state secrets 
privilege with "offhanded abandon"); cf. Robert M. Chesney, State Secrets and the Umits of 
National Security Utigation, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1249, 1252 (2007) (claiming that a survey 
of the invocation of the state secrets privilege since the 1950s indicates that "recent assertions 
of the privilege are not different in kind from the practice of other administrations"). 
62. See JANE MAYER, THE DARK SIDE: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW THE WAR ON TERROR 
TURNED INTO A WAR ON AMERICAN IDEALS 282--87 (2008) (detailing Khalid EI-Masri's plight). 
63. See Sudha Setty, Judicial Formalism and the State Secrets Privilege, 38 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 1630, 1634-35 (2012) (detailing the claims of Binyam Mohamed). 
64. E.g. , Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1092-93 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(en bane); EI-Masri v. United States, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530, 539 (E.D. Va. 2006), aff'd, 479 F.3d 
296 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 373 (2007). 
65. 154 GONG. REC. S198-201 (daily ed. Jan. 23, 2008) (statement of Sen. Kennedy on 
the State Secrets Protection Act). 
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200966 after the Obama administration appeared to adopt the Bush 
administration's stance in favor of a broad invocation and application 
of the privilege. 67 
Legislative reform efforts lost momentum after the Obama admin-
istration released a new policy for the Department of Justice in Sep-
tember 2009 that mandated a more rigorous internal administrative 
review prior to invoking the state secrets privilege. 68 That policy has 
been in effect for six years, but it appears that the internal review pro-
cess has resulted in little visible difference between the Bush and 
Obama administrations with regard to the invocation of the privilege 
at the pleadings stage in cases that often allege serious constitutional 
violations and human rights abuses. 69 More rigorous due process 
within the executive branch may indeed be more rights-protective, but 
because such evaluations have been kept secret and Congress and 
the public are not privy to that information, it appears that the Obama 
administration has adopted the "just trust us" view of due process that 
in some respects mirrors the actions of the Bush administration. 70 
Further, any future administration could easily undo any rights-protec-
tive due process measures that do exist, since the current process 
was not undertaken legislatively and does not engage Congress or 
the judiciary in a meaningful way. 
The use of the state secrets privilege becomes a matter of na-
tional security exceptional ism because, as in the case of torture, the 
66. See Press Release, Office of U.S. Sen. Patrick Leahy, Leahy, Specter, Feingold, Ken-
nedy Introduce State Secrets Legislation (Feb. 11, 2009) (on file at http://www.leahy.sen-
ate.gov/press/press_releases/release/?id=81 a 196e2-692e-498d-bf80-96ba81 e252b5). 
67. Editorial, Continuity of the Wrong Kind, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 11 , 2009), http://www.ny-
times.com/2009/02/11/opinion/11wed2.html (disagreeing with the Obama administration's de-
cision to continue the Bush administration invocations of the state secrets privilege to try to have 
lit igation against the government dismissed at the pleadings stage). 
68. See Memorandum from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Heads 
of Exec. Dep'ts & Agencies, Policies and Procedures Governing lnvocating of the State Secrets 
Privilege (Sept. 23, 2009) (on file at http://legaltimes.typepad.com/files/ag-memo-re-state-se-
crets-dated-09-22-09.pdf) [hereinafter Holder Memorandum] (establishing layers of internal re-
view within the Department of Justice and including a new executive branch policy to report to 
Congress any invocations of the state secrets privilege). 
69. See Sudha Setty, Utigating Secrets: Comparative Perspectives on the State Secrets 
Privilege, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 201 , 257-58 (2009) (identifying the continuity between the Bush 
and Obama administrations in their approach to the state secrets privilege). 
70. Most recently, the Obama administration invoked the state secrets privilege as a third 
party in a defamation suit, securing dismissal without disclosing to either party the basis on 
which the privilege was invoked. See US Government Invokes State Secrets Privilege to Have 
Iran Lawsuit Thrown Out, GUARDIAN (Mar. 23, 2015), http://www.theguard-
ian.com/world/2015/mar/23/us-government-lawsuit-iran-state-secrets. 
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Obama administration has suppressed the ability of individuals to liti-
gate their rights and hold government actors accountable for their 
past abuses. Further, a variety of political and structural incentives 
have created a situation where exceptionalism reigns and accounta-
bility from Congress or the courts does not exist: ideological alignment 
with the president, concern that national security is an issue within the 
president's sole jurisdiction, complacency, and an overly formalistic 
judiciary that chooses to defer to the president instead of engaging in 
its counter majoritarian obligation to protect fundamental rights 71 have 
all contributed to the lack of engagement on the question of redress 
for violations of human and civil rights. 
3. Use of Immigration Law in the National Security Context 
The government has, to some extent, conflated immigration and 
counterterrorism programs and has encouraged use of the immigra-
tion system as an important tool in counterterrorism efforts. 72 The re-
sult has been a system that, although legal under U.S. domestic law, 73 
arguably violates international law and norms with regard to the treat-
ment of migrants, 74 and most certainly is not rights-protective of the 
noncitizens caught in its framework. Juxtaposed against the unilateral 
executive action that has attempted to offer additional protection to 
some immigrant populations that is the subject of other articles in this 
symposium, the administration has leveraged the lowered due pro-
cess protections afforded to immigrants to conduct heightened sur-
veillance, engage in racial and religious profiling, and detain and 
remove immigrants on a sometimes specious basis. 
The government is authorized to detain any person for whom it 
has certified that reasonable grounds exist to believe that the person 
71 . See generally Setty, supra note 63 (discussing the overly fonnalistic approach of the 
judiciary with regard to government invocations of the state secrets privilege). 
72. See, e.g. , John Ashcroft, Att'y Gen., & James W. Ziglar, Comm'r, lmmigration & Natu-
ralization Serv., Announcement of INS Restructuring Plan (Nov. 14, 2001) (transcript at 
http://www.justice.gov/archive/ag/speeches/2001/agcrisisremarks11_14.htm ("The INS will also 
be an important part of our effort to prevent aliens who engage in or support terrorist activity 
from entering our country."). 
73. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP'T. OF HOMELAND SEC., OIG-11-81, SUPERVISION 
OF ALIENS COMMENSURATE WITH RISK 1 (2011 ) [hereinafter OHS 2011 IG Report] (noting that 
immigration authorities had generally complied with applicable domestic laws). 
74. See CTR. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND GLOBAL JUSTICE, ASIAN AM. LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. 
FUND, UNDER THE RADAR: MUSLIMS DEPORTED, DETAINED, AND DENIED ON UNSUBSTANTIATED 
TERRORISM ALLEGATIONS 18 (2011), http://aaldef.org/UndertheRadar.pdf [hereinafter UNDER 
THE RADAR) (citing the conclusion of the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Migrants that 
U.S. immigration enforcement policies violate international laws that bar arbitrary detention). 
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has engaged in espionage, 75 opposition by violence, 76 or terrorist ac-
tivity,77 or is involved with an organization that is suspected of terrorist 
activity. 78 Since September 11, 2001, the federal government has re-
lied heavily on immigration law and policy to detain, interrogate, con-
trol and remove suspected terrorists. 79 With fewer checks and 
balances, it is much easier for the government to arrest, detain, and 
investigate an individual under immigration law than criminal law. Un-
like the U.S. criminal justice system, where defendants have the right 
to an attorney, the right to a speedy trial, and the presumption of in-
nocence until guilt is proven beyond a reasonable doubt, immigration 
law does not afford detainees ample protections. For example, a 
noncitizen is permitted to have an attorney in immigration proceed-
ings, but counsel is not provided for the 80% of detainees in removal 
proceedings who are indigent. 8° Furthermore, a noncitizen can be 
mandatorily detained for months or years before being released or 
removed from the United States, and the standard for removal is that 
of "clear and convincing evidence," a much lower standard than the 
criminal justice conviction standard of beyond a reasonable doubt. 81 
These lesser protections have allowed federal officials to under-
take several initiatives that have targeted immigrants, primarily those 
from Muslim-majority countries, in the name of national security. Mus-
75. Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 237(a)(4)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4)(A)(i) 
(2012) (authorizing detention for those suspected of engaging in espionage, sabotage, or export 
control). 
76. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4)(A)(iii) (authorizing detention for those expressing opposition by 
violence or overthrow of the U.S. government). 
77. INA§ 212236(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (2012) (authorizing detention for those suspected 
of terrorist activity); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(lll), (iv)(l) (2012) (authorizing removal of those 
indicating an intention to cause death or serious bodily harm or have incited terrorist activity); 
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(VIVII) (making inadmissible aliens who endorse or espouse terrorist 
activity or persuade others to endorse or espouse terrorist activity). 
78. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi)(IIHIII); see also U. N. Sec. Council, Letter dated 
June 15, 2006 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to 
Resolution 1373 (2001) Concerning Counter-te"orism addressed to the President of the Secu-
rity Council, U.N. Doc. S/2006/397 (June 16, 2006) (noting that "if a group is designated or 
treated as a terrorist organization ... [for immigration purposes,) aliens having certain associa-
tions with the group (including persons who knowingly provide material support to the group) 
become inadmissible to and deportable from the United States."). 
79. In 2009, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) had over 1.6 million aliens in its 
scope of monitoring: in ICE detention centers, in other jails or prisons, or under a released 
monitoring system. See DHS 2011 IG Report, supra note 73, at 3. 
80. See UNDER THE RADAR, supra note 74, at 3. 
81. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(A). 
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lims in the immigration system have been subjected to possibly abu-
sive82 preventive detention, 83 exclusion based on political views, 
heightened surveillance and arguably unconstitutional racial profil-
ing. 84 Detainees in the immigration system face serious hurdles in 
challenging the government's case for removal due to the lower re-
moval standard of "clear and convincing evidence" as well as the in-
ability to access and challenge the secret evidence presented and 
alleged by the government. 8s 
Additionally, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)'s police 
powers have generated a high level of scrutiny and surveillance of 
immigrant populations within the United States. The lowered due pro-
cess protections accorded to immigrants allow for a more searching 
and less privacy-protective approach. Lawyers cite the presence of 
FBI agents during immigration proceedings, Immigration and Custom 
Enforcement's reliance on statements made in old FBI interviews in 
its decisions, and the FBI's submission of prejudicial affidavits raising 
national security concerns without providing the basis of the allega-
tions. FBI agents have used the structural power imbalances inherent 
in the immigration processes to coerce Muslim immigrants into be-
coming informants, or retaliate if they refuse.8s 
II. WHY NOT NATIONAL SECURITY EXCEPTIONALISM? 
The preceding section offered both the rationales for national se-
curity exceptionalism and several examples of it. The next question 
must then be, why not stick with national security exceptional ism? Be-
yond President Obama's exhortations that national security ought not 
82. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 667-69 (2009). 
83. Another category of detained aliens are those subject to an additional interagency 
screening called, Third Agency Check. This system to screen aliens in ICE custody who are 
from specially designated countries (SDCs) that have "shown a tendency to promote, produce, 
or protect terrorist organizations or their members." See DHS 2011 IG Report, supra note 73, 
at 5. The SOC list is largely comprised of majority Muslim nations. See ICE Ust of Specially 
Designated Countries (SDCs) that Promote or Protect Terrorism, PUBLIC INTELLIGENCE (July 2, 
2011), http://publicintelligence.neUspecially-designated-countries/. 
84. See UNDER THE RADAR, supra note 74, at 4 (discussing various programs targeting 
noncitizens, including Absconder Apprehension Initiative, NSEERS special registration policy, 
and Operation Frontline). Another controversial immigration policing program is Secure Com-
munities, which requires state and local police to send fingerprints of arrestees to ICE so that 
undocumented immigrants can be identified and possibly detained, prosecuted and removed. 
See Secure Communities, U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF'T, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., 
http://www.ice.gov/secure_communities/ (last visited Nov. 9, 2015) (describing the Secure 
Communities program). 
85. See UNDER THE RADAR, supra note 74, at 3, 4. 
86. See id. At 8. 
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be an exceptional context, the focus here should be on the compelling 
problem of a lack of accountability over the commission of human and 
civil rights abuses. Both legal and pragmatic problems arise by cate-
gorizing national security matters as being fundamentally separate 
from other areas in which the administration has worked to protect or 
improve human and civil rights. 
For example, the United States has long been party to interna-
tional treaties prohibiting torture and cruel, degrading, and inhuman 
treatment, as well as extra-judicial killing and the disparate treatment 
of individuals based on race, ethnicity, and religious expression. 
Among them are the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 87 the 
Geneva Conventions, 88 the International Covenant on Civil and Polit-
ical Rights, 89 the American Convention on Human Rights, 90 and the 
Convention Against Torture. 91 On the domestic level, the Fifth, Eighth 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution have been in-
terpreted as prohibiting torture, 92 and various domestic laws codify 
the obligations in the Convention Against Torture: the federal Torture 
Statute,93 the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991,94 the Alien Tort 
Claims Act, 95 and the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act 
of 1998.96 There are no loopholes in international and domestic law 
that allow for torture, even in times of emergency. Further, interna-
tional law demands that government-sanctioned torture must be in-
vestigated and prosecuted where found. The exceptionalism for the 
Bush administration was redefining the underlying acts so as to claim 
87. G.A. Res. 217 (I ll} A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948). 
88. Geneva Convention Relat ive to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 
U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons 
in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. 
89. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
90. American Convention on Human Rights, O.A.S. Treaty Series No. 36, July 18, 1978, 
1144 U.N.T.S. 123. 
91. U. N. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85. 
92. See generally Seth F. Kreimer, Too Close to the Rack and the Screw: Constitutional 
Constraints on Torture in the War on Terror, 6 U. PA. J. CaNST. L. 278 (2003). 
93. Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-236, § 506, 108 Stat. 382 
(codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-23408 (2006)). 
94. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (codified at 
28 U.S.C. § 1350)). 
95. Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350. 
96. Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 2242(a), 
112 Stat. 2681 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (2006)). 
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that whatever techniques were being used by interrogators on detain-
ees did not constitute torture. 97 For the Obama administration, the ex-
ceptionalism was deciding that, despite international law obligations 
to the contrary, the administration would not conduct an investigation 
into Bush-era torture98 and ultimately would not prosecute any of 
those involved.99 The administration has remained steadfast in this 
position despite the evidence made public through the Senate Torture 
Report, 100 and has aggressively sought dismissal of civil suits alleging 
torture, as described above. 
For targeted killings, the international legal standards are murk-
ier. The Obama administration's stated limits on the use of drones 
reflect a unilateralist legal interpretation of the applicable international 
and domestic legal constraints; as with much of the counterterrorism 
power that has aggregated in the executive branch since September 
2001, there is no venue for challenging the administration's legal po-
sition other than through public pressure. 101 In his May 2013 speech, 
97. Memos prepared by the Office of Legal Counsel in 2002 and 2003 advised the Presi-
dent and the military that detainees who were suspected members of AI Qaeda were not pro-
tected by international and domestic prohibitions against torture and, furthermore, that abuse of 
detainees would not constitute "torture" unless the interrogators intended to cause the type of 
pain associated with death or organ failure. See Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Asst. Att'y. 
Gen., to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Standards of Conduct for Interrogation 
Under 18 U.S. C.§§ 2340-2340A (Aug. 1, 2002); Memorandum from JayS. Bybee, Asst. Att'y. 
Gen., to John Rizzo, Acting Gen. Counsel of the Cent. Intelligence Agency, Interrogation of al 
Qaeda Operative (Aug. 1, 2002). Those memos were subsequently rescinded, and several 
members of the military were convicted at courts-martial for detainee abuse. See Scott Shane 
et al., Secret U.S. Endorsement of Severe Interrogations, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 4, 2007), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/04/washington/04interrogate.html?pagewanted=all. 
98. David Johnston & Char1ie Savage, Obama Reluctant to Look into Bush Programs, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 11, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/12/us/politics/12inquire.html (noting 
President Obama's statement that "we need to look forward as opposed to looking backwards"). 
99. Scott Shane, No Charges Filed on Harsh Tactics Used by the C.I.A. , N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 
30, 20 12), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/31/us/holder -rules-out-prosecutions-in-cia-interro-
gations.html. 
100. Jennifer Bendery & Ali Watkins, Despite Torture Uproar, DOJ still Says No to Prose-
cutions, HUFFINGTON PosT (Dec. 9, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/12/09/doj-tor-
ture_n_6298276.html. 
101. For comprehensive treatment of the aggregation of presidential counterterrorism 
power in during the Bush administration, see generally JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR 
PRESIDENCY (2009) (addressing the problematic aggregation of executive power during the 
Bush administration); FREDERICK A.O. SCHWARZ JR. & Az.IZ Z. HUO, UNCHECKED AND 
UNBALANCED: PRESIDENTIAL POWER IN A TIME OF TERROR (2007) (same). For similar assess-
ments of presidential power during the Obama administration, see generally Afsheen John Rad-
san, Bush and Obama Fight Terrorists Outside Justice Jackson's Twilight Zone, 26 CONST. 
COMMENT. 551 (2010), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1684720; Az.iz 
Rana, Responses to the Ten Questions, 37 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 5099 (2011 ), http://pa-
pers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2193084. 
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President Obama stated that he welcomed a conversation with Con-
gress about a potential drone court, but noted that, given the scope 
of executive power in the area of foreign policy and counterterrorism, 
such a court may not be constitutional. 102 Such a view provides little 
more than cold comfort to those seeking to protect the rights of citi-
zens and noncitizens being targeted for extrajudicial killings in the 
name of counterterrorism. 
For these contexts, exceptionalism cannot be justified from a 
purely legal perspective, so the fallback justification turns on prag-
matic concerns such as whether the administration thinks particular 
actions-like targeted killings or the non-prosecution of those in-
volved in torturing detainees-benefit U.S. security interests or make 
sense from the perspective of political viability. And in this respect, 
President Obama is unexceptional; many presidents have used these 
pragmatic, non-legal justifications for their national security actions. 
Perhaps the only thing exceptional about this situation is that Presi-
dent Obama had promised a return to a non-emergency footing for 
the government and a return of the primacy of the rule of law. 
CONCLUSION 
Some parts of President Obama's national security exceptional-
ism should not be surprising; he advertised as early as his first presi-
dential campaign that, if elected, he would send drones into Pakistan 
to target individuals there.103 Yet his shift on the issues identified here 
have created two problematic dynamics with regard to rights protec-
tion: first, President Obama's rhetoric about restoring the rule of law 
and curtailing the perceived abuses of executive power104 arguably 
could have translated into meaningful reform that differentiated the 
Obama administration from the Bush administration's approach on 
the exercise of unilateral executive power. 105 But repeated invoca-
tions of broad executive power and the excessive secrecy that has 
102. See May 2013 NDU Speech, supra note 42, at 8. 
103. E.g. , Presidential Debate Transcript, Sept. 26, 2008, MSNBC (Oct. 2, 2008), 
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/26990647/ns/politics-the_debates/t/presidential-debate-transcript-
sept/#. VbeeCvlcCSo. 
104. See Editorial, Mr. Obama and the Rule of Law, N.Y. T IMES (Mar. 21, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/22/opinion/22sun1.html (detailing the ways in which the 
Obama administration had already deviated from campaign promises to curtail executive power 
and restore the rule of law with regard to national security policies). 
105. See Sudha Setty, No More Secret Laws: How Transparency of Executive Branch Legal 
Policy Doesn't Let the Terrorists Win, 57 KAN. L. REV. 579, 596-98 (2009) (discussing the ways 
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surrounded many of the Obama administration's policies, combined 
with excessive deference from the judiciary106 and a lack of action in 
Congress on many of these matters, has essentially given a biparti-
san imprimatur to claims of extremely broad executive power, a lack 
of rights-protective action on behalf of those subject to unfair dispar-
ate impact by the government, and a lack of accountability for past 
abuses. 
Second, this exceptionalism has taken and continues to take a 
toll on the view of the United States in the international sphere. Even 
before he became president, Obama signaled the desire to reengage 
with the international community as a matter of legal compliance (e.g. , 
outlawing the use of so-called "enhanced interrogation tech-
niques"), 107 as good foreign policy (i.e., restoring America's moral au-
thority in the world) 10B and as a matter of restoring the rule of law. 109 
At least since 2009, the U.S. government has looked to garner the 
support and loyalty of allied nations that were skeptical of Bush-era 
U.S. counterterrorism efforts perceived to be dismissive of the coun-
tries' own priorities and cultural norms.110 President Obama's signing 
of the executive orders outlawing torture and closing the Guantanamo 
Bay detention facility on his first day in office were meant as strong 
signals that the U.S. government was responding to concerns that the 
United States flouted its own human rights standards, disregarded the 
rule of law, and lacked sensitivity to Muslims around the world. These 
in which the Bush administration employed a unilateralist unitary executive theory of power with 
regard to national security}. 
106. See Setty, supra note 63, at 1633-39 (detailing the overly deferential attitude of courts 
to invocations of the state secrets privilege by the Obama administration}. 
107. See Exec. Order No. 13491-Ensuring Lawful Interrogations, 74 Fed. Reg. at 4893-
94 (reiterating the international and domestic law parameters for interrogations of detainees 
suspected of terrorist activity}. 
108. Obama: We've Restored America's Standing', CNN (Nov. 18, 2009, 10:03AM}, 
http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/11/18/obama.henry/ (President Obama describing the 
ways in which the global community has improved its impression of United States foreign policy 
in the time since he took office}. 
109. Adam Cohen, Democratic Pressure on Obama to Restore the Rule of Law, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 14, 2008}, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/14/opinion/14fri4.html.?page-
wanted=print&_r=O (noting that Democratic legislators were planning to hold then President-
Elect Obama to his campaign promises to restore the rule of law}. 
110. See Brennan, supra note 40 (stating that maintaining strong alliances through uphold-
ing the rule of law was imperative}. 
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changes have served not only moral interests, but the realpolitik in-
terests of rebuilding trust and loyalty from traditionally-allied na-
tions. 111 
But continued national security exceptional ism engenders a view 
of the United States as considering itself to be above international 
obligations to investigate and prosecute torturers and war criminals, 
and the view by the global community that the United States is willing 
to apply one standard for itself, and another for the rest of the world. 
As such, the exceptionalism not only poses real challenges in terms 
of law, morality and building useful relationships with allied nations, 
but it acts as a step backward for the creation of enforceable interna-
tional norms and standards, and a step backward in efforts to restore 
a balance in the rule of law when it comes to national security matters. 
111. Sudha Setty, National Security Interest Convergence, 4 HARV. NAT'L SEC. J. 185, 212 
(2012). 
